## Trade Competitiveness and Legislators' Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements

What explains legislators' trade attitudes? We argue that legislators from districts that are competitive in manufacturing and agriculture are more supportive of trade agreements than legislators from non-competitive districts. This is so because competitive economic actors lobby their legislators for trade liberalization, whereas non-competitive actors lobby for protectionism. We use data based on

Prof. Andreas Dür

> Universität Salzburg

interviews with 3,808 legislators from 17 Latin
American countries between 2006 and 2018 to test our
expectations. These interviews captured legislators' attitudes
towards (potential) preferential trade agreements with the
United States, the European Union, the Bolivarian Alliance, and
the Pacific Alliance. We measure competitiveness at the district
level with an innovative combination of household survey data
and trade data. The evidence shows that the competitiveness of
the manufacturing sector, but not of agriculture, shapes the
degree to which legislators support trade agreements. This
finding holds for all four potential agreements and after controlling for legislators' partisanship, political ideology, and
individual and constituency characteristics. Our results have
implications for the literatures on trade attitudes, trade
policy more generally, and representation.

Donnerstag, 5. Dezember 2019, 14:00 Uhr, M 2.31 (Breitscheidstraße 2)
Alle sind herzlich eingeladen!

