Lobbying Across Multiple Levels (LiM)

German Federal Institutions, European Union, and the Länder (LiM)

Project Duration:
01/2021 – 09/2024

Funding:
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)

Principal Investigator: 
Prof. Dr. Patrick Bernhagen

Research Fellow:
Dr. Felix Goldberg
Dr. Florian Spohr

Student Assistants:
Krispin Krüger
Elisabeth Kutterer
Carina Schuster
Phillip Witte

 

In the European multi-level system, interest groups must coordinate their lobbying across different levels of government. While research on multi-level lobbying at the national and supranational levels is already quite well developed, the subnational level of policymaking is often overlooked in the literature on interest group politics. In particular, it is unexplored how and under what circumstances organized interests engage at multiple levels of government, move from one level to another, or commit to a specific level.

This research project therefore examines how organized interests coordinate their political activities across different levels of the EU's multi-level system. We define interest groups as collective actors that communicate their interests to the political system without seeking public office or contesting elections. Focusing on legislative lobbying, we include both economic interest groups and associations representing diffuse interests, as well as institutions and companies, in our analysis. The project thus contributes deeper insights to three major research areas: (1) research on subnational lobbying and lobbying in federal systems, (2) the literature on lobbying in the European multi-level system, and (3) research on venue choice. Our focus here is on German interest groups.

Following Greenwood (2017), we identify four distinct “routes” that interest groups can use to influence national legislation (see figure). The National Route comprises direct lobbying of federal ministries and the Bundestag (German federal parliament). In addition, we argue that interest groups can pursue three different routes at other levels of government to bypass the national executive and parliament: The Brussels Route involves EU institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, which increasingly influence national legislation. The Domestic Subnational Route operates through state institutions, where state governments coordinate their positions on federal legislation. Finally, the Subnational Brussels Route includes arenas of coordination between regional actors and EU institutions.

Based on survey data on 23 selected laws, we have published two articles to date as part of this research project:

  • Spohr, F.; Bernhagen, P.; Krüger, K.; Goldberg, F. 2025: Lobbying on Multiple Routes to Influence National Legislation: German Federalism and the European Union. Regional & Federal Studies. [Link to publication]
  • Spohr, F.; Bernhagen, P.; Krüger, K.; Subnational Lobbying on National Policymaking. Evidence from Germany. Governance 38 (2), e70012. [Link to publication]

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