Im Rahmen des Forschungskolloquiums von Herrn Prof. Bernhagen.
Zeit & Raum:
Donnerstag, 16.5.2019, 14.00 - 15.30 Uhr, Breitscheidstraße 2, M 2.31
Abstract (Vortrag in deutscher Sprache):
The resurgence of radical and populist parties of the left and right across Europe have stimulated discussions about the way these new radical challenger parties affect the dynamics of party competition, legislative politics and coalition politics in European parliaments. The present paper seeks to contribute to the debate and explore the conditions for particular institutional arrangements (such as the prime minister’s legislative dissolution powers or positive parliamentarism) to serve as ‘shock absorbers’ protecting cabinet stability in the face of more polarized parliamentary politics. The paper will start from traditional theoretical debates on the impact of ideological polarization on cabinet survival in parliamentary systems. It will test the predictive power of models focusing on the impact of extreme parties on the bargaining environment of (coalition) cabinets on the one hand and a veto-player framework on the other. Subsequently these models will be enriched by hypotheses on the moderating effect of particular legislative institutions. A latent competing-risks framework will be employed to estimate the effects of ideological polarization, different institutional arrangements and the interaction of polarization and institutional rules on the risk of cabinet terminations through cabinet reshuffles and early elections.
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